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Act (“UFTA”), as enacted in Florida, authorizes a receiver standing in the shoes of the 
corporation, to commence certain fraudulent conveyance actions against third parties.5  
 A receiver, however, lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of a corporation, where a 
receiver is unable to treat the corporation as a separate legal entity from the insiders who 
perpetrated the fraud.6 Thus, in the case of a Ponzi scheme, where the enterprise that existed was 
fraudulent, an issue arises as to whether a receiver, acting on behalf of the company that 
managed the Ponzi scheme, has standing to bring such claims.7 In such cases, a majority of 
courts have found that a receiver lacks standing to commence a fraudulent conveyance action 
because the corporation and insiders were functionally equivalent.8 The only entities entitled to 
bring such claims are the individual customers who lost their assets.9  
 For example, in Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit held that a receiver lacked standing to commence an action against a 
financial institution for aiding and abetting a Ponzi scheme, because he represents the 
receivership and not the individuals who were the actual victims of the fraud.10 Thus, since the 
receiver stands in the shoes of the corporation, the bad acts of the corporation remain inherently 
within the receivership.11 Additionally, the court held that the court-appointed receiver could not 
recover a deposit made by its principals into various bank accounts within the same financial 
 
5 See Fla. Stat. § 726.102(14); see also Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296, 1308 
(11th Cir. 2020). 
6 Freeman, 865 So.2d at 551. 
7 Id. at 552. 
8 See id. 
9 Id. at 551. 
10 Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1308. 
11 Id. 
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institution, because under UFTA, such a transaction was not a “transfer” within the meaning of 
the statutory language, regardless of whether such amounts were the subject of a Ponzi scheme.12  
Part I of this memorandum addresses what qualifies as a “transfer” under the specific 
language of Florida’s enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and why an 
intercompany transfer between two bank accounts cannot be deemed a transfer. Then, part II 
analyzes the claims that a receiver can bring and when a receiver lacks standing to bring such 
claims. Finally, Part III concludes with addressing who, if anyone, may actually have standing to 
recover the fraudulent transfers in those scenarios.  
I. Determining if a “Transfer” Under UFTA has Occurred  
A. Defining “Transfer” Under UFTA 
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that creditors may avoid a debtor’s 
fraudulent transfers to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.13 To prevail on a claim 
of actual fraud, a creditor must demonstrate (1) there was a creditor to be defrauded, (2) a debtor 
intending fraud, and (3) a transfer of property which could have been applicable to the payment 
of the debt due.14 Currently, UFTA defines a “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, 
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or 
interest in an asset.”15 Although the definition of transfer is broad, the statute explicitly requires 
the plaintiff to show that the debtor either disposed of his asset or relinquished some interest in 
that asset.16  
 
12 See id. at 1305. 
13 Fla. Stat. § 726.108(1)(a); Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1302. 
14 Wiand v. Lee, 752 F.3d 1194, 1199–1200 (11th Cir. 2014). 
15 Fla. Stat. § 726.108(1)(a); Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1302. 
16 Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1302. 
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In determining whether a transfer was made with actual intent to defraud a creditor, 
courts look to “badges of fraud” that indicate whether fraud has occurred.17 These badges of 
fraud include whether, for example, the transfer was to an insider, the debtor remained in control 
of the property after the transfer, the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets, or the 
debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made.18 However, proof 
that a transfer was made in furtherance of a Ponzi scheme generally establishes actual intent to 
defraud under UFTA, without the need to consider whether the badges of fraud are present.19 
Thus, a determination that a corporation was operated as a Ponzi scheme is in itself enough to 
qualify any transfers made to or from the receiverships as qualifying transfers made to defraud 
creditors under UFTA.20  
B. Application of “Transfer” Definition in the Context of Intercompany Transfers 
The Eleventh Circuit found that a routine bank deposit, however, is not a transfer under 
UFTA.21 Under UFTA, whether a transfer has occurred hinges on if the debtor has relinquished 
some interest or control over the asset.22 Intercompany transfers clearly do not fall within such 
standard.23 That is, because, at all relevant times, the accountholder had access to the funds it 
deposited – i.e., it never relinquished control.24  
 Similarly, the definition of “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code also excludes ordinary 
deposits.25 Under section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code, a “transfer” is defined as “(A) the 
 
17 See Lee, 752 F.3d at 1200. 
18 Id. 
19 See id. at 1201. 
20 See id. 
21 See Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1302. 
22 See Levine v. Weissing (In re Levine), 134 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir. 1998). 
23 See Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1302. 
24 See id. at 1303. 
25 In re Whitley, 848 F.3d 205, 208 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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creation of a lien; (B) the retention of title as a security interest; (C) the foreclosure of a debtor’s 
equity of redemption; or (D) each mode . . . of disposing or parting with —(i) property; or (ii) an 
interest in property.”26 In determining that an ordinary deposit does not fall within the express 
language of the definition of transfer, courts have relied upon the fact that a deposit of money 
upon general account with a bank “creates an ordinary debt, not a privilege right of fiduciary 
character.”27 And this “ordinary debt,” with the Bank’s corresponding obligation that the funds 
be available at the depositor’s will, corresponds with the notion that control of the money has 
never been relinquished by the depositor and thus the action cannot be deemed a transfer.28  
II. A Court-Appointed Receiver Does Not Have Standing to Recover Fraudulent 
Transfers Under UFTA if the Action was Not Previously Owned by the Party in the 
Receivership 
 
A. Role of the Court-Appointed Receiver 
While a receivership is typically created to protect the rights of creditors, the receiver is 
not the class representative for creditors and receives no general assignment of rights from the 
creditors.29 Rather, the receiver is limited to bringing only those actions previously owned by the 
party in the receivership.30 These include “actions that the corporation, which has been 
‘cleansed’ through receivership, may bring directly against the principals or the recipients of 
fraudulent transfer of corporate funds to recover assets rightfully belonging to the corporation 
and taken prior to the receivership.”31 Thus, while the receiver has standing to recover assets 
rightfully belonging to a corporation, this only applies when the actions of the corporation can be 
 
26 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2018). 
27 N.Y. Cty. Nat’l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 145 (1904). 
28 See In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 209; see also Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1303. 
29 See Freeman, 865 So.2d at 549. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 551. 
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separated from the actions of a rogue employee.32 If this separation has not been adequately 
established, the receiver cannot pursue claims otherwise owned directly by the creditors.33  
B. Standing of the Court-Appointed Receiver  
The receivership entities that the court-appointed receiver represents cannot assert a tort 
claim against a third party for aiding and abetting a Ponzi scheme because the entity itself was 
not injured.34 Rather, it was the individual investors who actually suffered the loss.35 The 
Eleventh Circuit held in Isaiah that because the state court order in the case specifically 
authorized and empowered Isaiah to file suit to recover only property of the receivership entities 
that actually belonged to the receivership entities, any claims of aiding and abetting belong to the 
defrauded investors and not the receivership entity.36 Thus, Isaiah did not have standing to 
pursue a claim.37  
III. A Corporation does not have Standing to Recover Fraudulent Transfers Under 
UFTA if it has not been “Cleansed” of the Sins of its Predecessor  
 
Courts have found that whether a claim can be made on behalf of a receivership depends 
on whether the corporation is found to have been “cleansed” through receivership, or whether the 
fraud and intentional torts of the insiders can be separated from the corporation itself.38  
A. Cleansing Through Receivership 
“Where a corporation is operated by a Ponzi scheme, it is still in the eyes of the law a 
separate entity with rights and duties.”39 When assets that are meant to be used for the 
 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 549. 
34 See Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1308. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 Freeman, 865 So.2d at 551. 
39 Lee, 753 F.3d at 1202. 
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corporation’s stated purpose are transferred for an unauthorized purpose to the detriment of the 
defrauded investors, the corporation itself is harmed because the defrauded investors are tort 
creditors of the corporation.40 Although the corporation may have participated in the fraudulent 
transfers prior to receivership, once the individual tortfeasor is removed and a receiver is 
appointed, the corporation becomes entitled to the return of its assets that had been diverted for 
unauthorized purposes, e.g., to perpetrate a Ponzi scheme.41 Thus, for example, a corporation had 
standing to sue under UFTA when investor funds were fraudulently diverted to the defendant 
“‘for the lease of a luxury car.’”42 The corporation became a creditor of the Ponzi schemer at the 
time he fraudulently diverted investor funds for his personal use because, as UFTA requires, the 
corporation had a ‘claim’ against him.43  
However, this principal only stands when “[t]he money it receives from investors [is] 
used for the corporation’s stated purpose.”44 If the corporation’s sole purpose is to promote the 
Ponzi scheme, this principal does not apply because it is impossible to prove the corporation 
served any other legitimate purpose.45  
B. Separating a Corporation from its Insiders  
Unless the corporation in receivership has at least one honest member on the board of 
directors, or an innocent stockholder, the fraud and intentional torts of the insiders cannot be 




42 Sale v. Ferrari Financial Services, Inc., No. 19-23563-CIV-MORENO, 2020 WL 5750502, at 
*4 (S.D. Fl. Sept. 25, 2020). 
43 Lee, 752 F.3d at 1202–03. 
44 Id. at 1202. 
45 See Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1306. 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
and distinct from the individual tortfeasors.46 In Freeman, the court-appointed receiver was 
unable to establish that NorthAmerican, the receivership entity, was “freed . . . from the spell” of 
the Grazianos, the insiders who actually committed the fraud.47 Thus, because Mr. Freeman was 
unable to show that any honest person existed within NorthAmerican, who was not at all times 
simultaneously under the control of the Grazianos, he was unable to establish that there was any 
injury suffered by NorthAmerican in its capacity as a corporation.48 As said torts cannot be 
separated from the receivership entities, the receivership as a whole is liable for the actions 
perpetrated on behalf of the Ponzi scheme, and it cannot recover.49  
C. Standing to Recover 
While the corporation and the receiver of the corporation both lack standing to recover 
any fraudulent transfers perpetrated by the Ponzi scheme, this does not leave investors entirely 
without remedy.50 While the corporation did not suffer injury as a result of the Ponzi scheme, 
individual customers who suffered injury based on their coerced investments may have a right to 
pursue claims that allegedly aided and abetted that scheme.51 To allow otherwise would 
essentially “usurp the claims that properly belong to those creditors.”52 This emphasis on 
allowing only individual creditors to pursue tort claims against third parties limits the role of 
court-appointed receivers in this realm and dismantles the receivership entity when it comes to 
third party liability. However, it does assure individual investors that there are potential means 
for recovery.  
 
46 See Freeman, 865 So.2d at 551.  
47 See id. at 551–52. 
48 Id. at 552. 
49 Id. 
50 See Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1307. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1310. 
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Conclusion 
Although a court-appointed receiver is generally provided to protect the rights of 
creditors, an individual’s role as a receiver is limited to standing in the shoes of the receivership 
as an entity.53 Therefore, unless a corporation is said to have been cleansed of the sins of its 
predecessor, any fraudulent claims against a third party cannot be made either by the corporation 
itself or the court-appointed receiver.54 Furthermore, while a determination of who has standing 
is relevant in an analysis of recovering under UFTA, the fraudulent transfers looking to be 
recovered must also fall within the statutory definition of a transfer.55  
Henceforth, while neither a court-appointed receiver, nor the corporation itself, have 
standing to bring a common law tort action against a third party for aiding and abetting a Ponzi 
scheme, individual creditors in their capacity as defrauded investors have standing to pursue 
these claims if the transfer qualifies as a relinquishment of funds by the fraudster.56  
 
 
53 Id. at 1308. 
54 Id. at 1306. 
55 Fla. Stat. § 726.102(14). 
56 See Freeman, 865 So.2d at 553; see Fla. Stat. § 726.102(14); see also Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1302. 
